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MOTIVATED MARKETS: Instruments and Ideologies of Clean Energy in the United Kingdom 
JOSHUA RENO 
Goldsmiths College, University of London 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
[rh]MOTIVATED MARKETS 
“Green” or “natural” capitalism (Foster 2002; Hawken et al. 1999; Kovel 1999) is 
typically concerned with the reconciliation of ecological and economic values. By green 
capitalism I refer to forms of political economy that seek to appropriate the reproductive 
potential of biomaterials or to nurture and sustain such potential or both (see Hayden 2003; 
Helmreich 2008; Rajan 2006; Sodikoff 2007). These aims are typically thought to be troubled in 
one of two ways: either by the difficulty (if not the impossibility) of establishing metrics to 
adequately account for the “true value” of nature, or by what Marxian ecologists refer to as a 
metabolic rift that progressively divides capitalist industry and labor from the nonhuman 
environment on which they depend (see Foster 2000; Clark and York 2005; O’Connor 1997). In 
this article, I explore market devices that are meant to establish such metrics and bridge such rifts 
through the promotion of renewable energy as a commercially viable substitute for fossil fuels. 
Efforts to promote “clean energy economies” are founded on the belief that capitalism 
should be motivated by the real limitations and possibilities of the earth, not by the exchange of 
purportedly abstract or fictitious representations of value.1 Those committed to the pursuit of 
clean energy seek to plan economies around resources that avoid the grave social and 
environmental costs of fossil fuels. Unlike the planet’s vanishing oil reserves, sunlight, wind, and 
waves are relatively plentiful, regenerate quickly, and when exploited typically have a reduced 
ecological impact. For this reason, the promotion of renewable energy is increasingly part of the 
policy agendas of industrial nations and environmental groups, fostered by experiments at once 
technical, economic, and governmental. 
To grapple with these ongoing efforts of social transformation, I focus on the Renewables 
Obligation (RO) of England and Wales, which involves the creation of a government-sponsored 
market in virtual “renewability” to subsidize the production of renewable energy and generate 
demand for it. Although there are many ways of accomplishing these goals, Euro-American 
economists and government officials tend to favor polices that utilize financial incentives. Like 
markets in carbon offsets, renewable energy policy in the United Kingdom is a form of 
neoliberal governance; rather than merely force compliance it seeks to motivate individuals 
through financial incentives. Such policies rely on assumptions about how individuals can be 
motivated to act in accordance with policy directives. Economic interests, it is thought, can be 
harnessed as a political mechanism to bolster green virtues; the assumption being that the actors 
in question possess a desire for wealth that can be channeled into reform: Homo economicus and 
Homo ecologicus are made one through market design. 
According to the material sociology of finance, broadly associated with the work of 
Michel Callon (1998, 2009) and Donald MacKenzie (2009) among others, individual actors in a 
market can approximate the “economically rational” self-interest described by economists with 
the help of the various technical devices they have at their disposal. A person at a grocery store, 
for example, is not alone, but may be accompanied by an itemized list, a calculator, coupons, 
signs advertizing special deals, price tags, a receipt, and so on. “Interests are not given,” writes 
MacKenzie, “they are calculated” as part of larger sociotechnical arrangements of persons and an 
assortment of market devices (2009:25). I discuss the relationship between participants in the 
United Kingdom’s renewable energy sector and different environmental and economic devices 
that facilitate their actions, focusing in particular on the different ways market devices channel 
environmental and economic motivations as well as reshape them into new and potentially 
alienating forms. 
I examine the RO primarily from the perspective of small-scale generators, who make up 
nearly two-thirds of the renewable energy facilities in the United Kingdom, but are responsible 
for less than one percent of renewable energy produced (Ofgem 2009:37). I begin by discussing 
the beginnings of the renewable energy sector among U.K. farmers and the transformations 
brought about through market-based policies. I focus on farmers, in particular, because their 
experiences illustrate the complex intentions associated with making the environmental 
economic. In the United Kingdom, farms and farm animals have recently served as critical sites 
for the representation and governance of the most pressing environmental issues, including 
genetic engineering (GM crops, cloning), climate change (methane emissions), and global 
pandemics (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, foot-and-mouth disease). For some, waste-to-
energy digesters promise to transform a dangerous pollutant (animal wastes) into an 
environmental good (renewable energy) at a time when both environmental credibility and 
economic security are increasingly uncertain. 
I demonstrate that renewable energy producers, including U.K. farmers and energy 
suppliers and traders, participate in the market in renewables in ways that are out of sync with 
the predictions of policymakers. To explain the significance of green certificates for RO 
participants, I draw on the notion of social payment (Guyer 2004; Maurer 2007), which 
highlights the variety of ways that these virtual commodities are accounted for, whether as forms 
of wealth, moral currency, regulatory obligation, or risk. 
Although participants in the renewable market demonstrate a wide variety of economic 
actions and motivations, market devices record their transactions as examples of “competitive 
exchange” and “self-interest,” thereby reproducing authoritative facts about the market in 
accordance with neoliberal accounts. Contemporary tools of economic reflection and 
intervention emerged in the early 20th century alongside the increasing dependency of capitalist 
democracy on fossil fuels (Mitchell 2009:416). Therefore it is not only the effects of economic 
reforms, but also their translation into economic expertise that requires analysis. 
Following Timothy Mitchell (2005) and Webb Keane (2008), I emphasize the role of 
market devices, especially renewable energy meters and auctions, in furthering neoliberal models 
of the economic, as well as providing a means of contesting them. Such devices not only help 
market participants calculate their interests and make economic decisions, as Callon and 
MacKenzie suggest, they also make the motivations of those participants calculable as objects of 
economic knowledge. The economic “facts” that result, I argue, frame economic action in a 
narrow way that shapes the reflections of renewable policy experts as well as their critics. 
My goal in this article is not to advocate a particular method of energy reform. Rather, I 
want to explore the means by which green markets are thought possible—and by extension, new 
forms of capitalism—as well as the implications this has for the economic as a form of expert 
knowledge and social practice. In the conclusion, I discuss the significance of models of the 
person in the creation of renewable energy and climate change policies more broadly, arguing for 
more appreciation of the importance of uncertainty, ambivalence, and the incongruities of social 
action. 
[h1]GROWING AND GOVERNING ENERGY 
In the summer of 2008, I toured the U.K. countryside with James Murcott,2 an expert on 
anaerobic digestion or “digesters,” visiting some of the 35 facilities he had helped develop. 
“Fossil-fuel farming is a dead-end road,” he told me, and abandoning this path does not mean 
devoting farms to a new purpose—planting “energy crops” to create biofuel, for instance—but 
recognizing the untapped potential of their wastes. Designs vary, but typically digesters involve a 
vessel into which various biomaterials are pumped, after which they are mixed together and 
broken down to form two substances: a fertilizer high in nitrogen and methane, a combustible 
biogas. 
For Murcott, such technology realizes a dream of improved agriculture: “[It] gives you 
energy as a byproduct, but it gives you odor control, it gives you better nutrient management. 
When you take the carbon out of the waste stream, you are making the nutrients more available 
for fertilizer.” Like others, Murcott became interested in renewables during the energy crisis of 
1973–74, “We had a flood of books, people that set about gathering information that would help 
us. There were books about wind energy, solar, and a little on digesters.” Murcott preferred the 
reliability of digesters: “The wind blowing, the sun shining, tends to be unpredictable; that pile 
of muck in the yard is very predictable.” Following examples from India and China, he built a 
prototype “baby digester” for his father-in-law’s chicken farm, a 2 m3 unit just big enough to 
produce gas for cooking. 
In the mid-1970s, Murcott formed a company with his wife’s cousin that would become 
the primary digester supplier in the United Kingdom. He later formed a different company to 
focus exclusively on farm digesters, with the assistance of the U.K. Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food, and Fish (MAFF), which distributed digester grants to encourage rural diversification. One 
of his clients was Phillip Nelson, a Welsh farmer who wanted a digester to heat his houses and 
dairy operation, improve his fertilizer, and reduce his dependence on fossil fuels. A small 
agricultural university used a large digester for their livestock. Another Welshman used the 
technology to “go organic” to improve the quality of his cheese (see Figure 1). Murcott’s plants 
were still running as many as two decades later. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
But the political landscape of renewables was changing. In the mid-1990s, MAFF 
stopped its grant program and another company with controlling interest liquidated Murcott’s 
digester business. The grants had been replaced with a market-based program to encourage the 
production of renewable energy for sale. In 1990, the conservative government decided to 
subsidize renewables (particularly nuclear power) as part of its bid to privatize the energy sector 
(Mitchell 2000:286). Europe’s first such initiative, this initial policy was managed like a 
competitive grant: the government would order a specific quantity of renewable energy, and then 
select the lowest bidders for different technology “bands” (e.g., wind, solar, etc.). Regional 
electricity companies were obliged to purchase all the renewable energy projects in their area at a 
premium price. Suppliers were obliged to purchase all the energy from projects awarded grants. 
As concerns about climate change and energy security mounted among interest groups 
throughout Europe, more procurement schemes emerged. Prior to the deregulation of EU energy 
markets, the policy most often implemented by European governments was some variation of 
feed-in tariff (FIT), such as Germany introduced in 1991. Like the initial U.K. plan, FIT obliges 
regional suppliers to buy from renewable generators at a fixed price but makes this available to 
any generator and has no quota (Ringel 2006:6). Although costly, FIT proved more successful at 
procurement—by 2003 FIT was responsible for at least 84 percent of the power generated from 
wind in the European Union (Meyer and Koefoed 2003:598). 
For these and other reasons, in 2001 the U.K. New Labour government introduced the 
Renewables Obligation. The RO retained quota obligations, as well as competition: energy 
suppliers were obliged to invest in a growing number of renewables annually (specified as a 
specific fraction of their total energy output) or pay a “buyout fee” for every megawatt hour 
(MWh) they fell below their obligation. Fulfillment of this obligation is demonstrated by 
purchasing Renewables Obligation Certificates (or ROCs). Each green certificate or credit is a 
virtual representation of one MWh of renewable electricity generated in the United Kingdom. 
From this demand for renewable credits arises a supplementary market, which provides a 
separate income to generators for the virtual “renewability” of the energy they produce (see 
Figure 2). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
 
The complex value of ROCs adds a further “gaming” element to encourage suppliers to 
exceed their obligation (Mitchell et al. 2006:300). At the end of every obligation period, money 
from the buyout fund (collected from all those who failed to meet their full quota) is “recycled” 
back into the value of each accumulated renewability credit, thus ideally rewarding suppliers 
who overachieve in producing or buying green energy at the expense of others. 
In 2008, for example, the obligation was for 7.9 percent of energy supplied in England 
and Wales to be from renewables (22 million MWh), increased from 6.7 percent in 2007. Thirty 
energy suppliers turned over 14.5 million ROCs to the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
(Ofgem), satisfying roughly 64 percent of the total obligation, which meant that the buyout fund 
from noncompliance was high (more than £280 million) and the ultimate value of each credit 
increased to £52.95. Because there is more financial incentive to exceed the obligation than to 
pay the buyout, ROCs are thought to encourage further renewable investment. 
The RO diagrammed above serves as a model of moral accountability. As with the 
conservative government’s plan, energy supply companies are held directly responsible by the 
government for financing a clean energy economy. A renewability credit serves as a record of 
who has contributed what amount to the growth of clean energy.3 Other social exclusions 
become apparent at the technical level. Renewable projects can only earn ROCs if they seem 
viable enough to attract sufficient outside funding and progress through the difficult planning 
phase. For this reason, more established companies in Western and Northern Europe are 
increasingly attracted to the United Kingdom, where they can successfully compete for contracts. 
The digesters that are now built on U.K. farms reflect a change from 20 years ago, 
indicating that market-based approaches are reshaping motivations from consumption to 
production of energy. New plants tend to rely on German technology more than the Murcott’s 
designs. Alan Sloan’s digester is one example. He sought out a German partner to demonstrate 
and distribute digester technology from his farm in Dorset. With its backing, he installed a 2,800 
m3 digester to process his corn and cow slurry into renewable energy and credits. Even some of 
Murcott’s former clients have decided to sell gas. Nelson, one of the Welsh farmers introduced 
above, invested in an innovative three-stage digester, also of German origin and built around the 
plant Murcott installed, primarily to enhance energy production for ROCs. 
Through market-based initiatives, an alternative model of renewability focused on the 
farm as an organic process is losing favor to one focused on the development of new sources of 
energy for the national grid. Murcott’s approach to digesters tends to emphasize saving rather 
than producing energy. Digesters, he argues, should mimic the economical makeup of animal 
bodies: 
[ex]Are you familiar with a cow? A cow plucks the grass using its tongue and puts it into 
its first stomach, where it undergoes biological breakdown. It doesn’t chew it. It then sits 
on the ground and ruminates, which means it regurgitates its food and macerates. So it 
macerates it after the first stage of digestion, and that means it takes less energy for the 
maceration stage. A chicken eats its food whole and has a macerator in its gizzard that 
actually helps it to break down its food internally. … And you can apply all of these 
things to your digester design. … I think you’ll find that pre-digestion is going to become 
a more preferred way of doing things. It requires less energy. 
According to this model, farm production and energy generation from waste ought to be 
integrated as if part of a living organism. For Murcott, this began as a way to adapt Indian 
designs to a cooler environment; to address the heating and mixing demands of U.K. farms, gas 
is circulated back into the digester to drive the mechanical maceration of material. Similarly, 
excess gas is pumped into the farmhouse to be used for cooking and heating, because that is seen 
to be more energy efficient than pumping it into a grid to contribute to the nation’s renewable 
quotas. 
The digesters based on German designs represent a different approach, which interrupts 
the recycling of energy back into the farm. After Sloan’s digester was fully commissioned, it 
could not send power to the grid or register ROCs because the tank was too acidic, threatening 
the engine with corrosion. Until a neutralizing base could be added, Sloan was losing money on 
an “insecure” product from the standpoint of energy production, although it was perfectly usable 
as a source of heat. But Sloan didn’t finance his digestor for heat. Neither did the Welsh farmer 
Nelson; in his new German digester, where gas had once been channeled to a boiler, heat 
exchangers now draw waste heat from the engine as it converts methane into electricity. This 
way the ROC meter registers as much gas as possible, while heat use is subordinated to the 
generation of electricity. 
In some ways, this shift to production for the grid introduces new forms of alienation that 
can interrupt daily life on the farm as well. For energy to be traded, whether as a commodity or 
credit, generators need to be connected to energy consumers drawing from the national grid. 
Rural digesters are typically too small to connect to the grid the normal way; instead, they must 
transmit energy through the distribution network. But network connection is not so simple. In 
Sloan’s case, the local water board identified the location of a water main incorrectly, and a pipe 
was mistakenly ruptured, shutting off water to 44 homes and four farms for several hours. 
Other tensions arise through the technology, showing its ability to frustrate some of the 
agricultural values that Murcott’s more organic design was meant to realize. It is evident that 
reorienting the digester toward energy production has changed Nelson’s farm in Wales, and not 
entirely to his liking. During my tour, he moved freely through every area, around cows and 
through gates, excitedly explaining his plans to digest hay with slurry, pointing out what 
equipment needed replacing or describing the gas potential of chicken litter. But toward the end 
of the visit, at the farm’s edge, Nelson stopped to complain that he was forbidden from entering 
the locked, fenced-off shack where the electrical transformers connect to the grid. Connecting to 
the distribution network meant inviting an alien structure into an intimate space, enclosed to 
“protect” him from the high voltage generated from his own animals, creating a spatial analogue 
to the conversion of his biogas into an alienable product. 
Nelson’s farm has borne witness to the shift in the U.K. from renewable energy as farm 
management to renewability as a tradable commodity. For Sloan and his newly built digester, 
establishing connections to the grid is an opportunity to prove the value of digesters to his 
neighbors—some of whom remember well his past interest in GM crops. When I visited his 
plant, one of the pipelines was left uncommitted so that it might one day provide free gas to the 
community. As will be discussed in the next section, revaluing energy through market 
instruments like ROCs does not foreclose investment in the moral and material improvement of 
farms, even as it reshapes how they can be accounted for. 
[h1]ACCOUNTING FOR ROCS 
Countless anthropological studies have challenged the characterization of financial 
instruments (wages, taxes, bonds, derivatives, etc.) as merely asocial forces of pure 
rationalization and commodification (Bloch and Parry 1989; Lemon 1998; Akin and Robbins 
1999; Maurer 2005). In the United Kingdom, ROCs coexist with a multiplicity of social actions 
and motivations, interests and responsibilities. As the British countryside endures profound 
change, farming involves wider debates that implicate not only plants and animals, family and 
neighbors, but regulators and the global food trade. The anticipation of green credits recasts 
decisions about the management of farms in a variety of ways, revealing the complex motives 
out of which the emergent renewability market is derived, as well as conceptions of the 
economic more broadly. 
Following the work of Jane Guyer (2004), Bill Maurer argues that some forms of 
financial action, which he calls “social payments,” fall outside the sphere of exchange altogether: 
“[A] vast number of things financial … stand aside from the quantitative machinery that many 
have taken to be capitalism’s hallmark. Rather, they involve payments, efforts to avoid 
payments, the consequences of those efforts, and the creation and manipulation of debt” 
(2007:127). Such payments are more broadly “social” because they involve a debt relationship 
and the creative hesitations and manipulations this can entail. David Graeber (2011) points out 
that debt cannot be reduced to relations of exchange or reciprocity, but in its purest expression 
coincides with relations of hierarchy. Taxes, for example, are not about an exchange between 
equal partners, but about a political subject giving an obligatory payment, one that cannot be 
finally repaid during one’s lifetime. And yet, this obligation can be deferred and manipulated; 
there are tax “write offs,” “evasions,” and “cheats.” I draw on Maurer and Graeber as a reminder 
that financial instruments are about more than actively desired and accumulated forms of wealth, 
but ambivalently accounted for and negotiated payments. 
ROCs, like connections to the national grid, offer new ways of calculating for the day-to-
day business of farm management. Nelson claims “environmental” concerns as the primary 
reason he renovated the original digester Murcott designed. He expressed anxiety about climate 
change: “If we mess up the climate, there’ll be no hiding place—we’re all in this together.” In 
this sense, ROCs stand for environmental responsibility. In the same way, “carbon” is not only 
tradable as a commodity but increasingly works as a form of moral currency in ecological 
discourse, a way of accounting that stands in for one’s willingness to do something about 
environmental degradation. Nelson’s sense of environmental care through digester technology is 
not only about moral accounting but practical management of the farm, as he puts it “getting 
better use of the fertilizer value of those manures.” The best evidence of environmental impact, 
from his perspective, is that he’s “never had such thick and strong grass” as he is getting from 
the fertilizer spread on his fields. ROCs were meant to enable this further integration of farm and 
digester. 
Unlike the Murcott design, new German digesters force farmers to consider their 
financial circumstances more carefully. Nelson claims he was “a bit blind” in his pursuit of 
ROCs at first, with only a rough idea of what to expect regarding costs and financial returns. If 
so, this seems to have changed over time. When I last spoke with him, Nelson had lost an 
estimated £70,000 because of a technical difficulty establishing proper electrical balance 
between his generator and the grid. He has also found it challenging to find a good price for the 
food waste they buy, which is not only a good additive to the digester but a popular source of pet 
food. Nelson’s biggest concern, however, is what he was offered for his ROCs—4.5 p per kWh, 
which has declined a further 0.9 p with falling energy prices. Even doubled, this is far less than 
he anticipated. 
Yet, Nelson showed little interest in selling his ROCs for potentially higher value on the 
open market or at auction, in keeping with the government’s incentive program and its 
presumption of self-interested subjects. When I mentioned the possibility in response to his 
financial woes, he shrugged, as if it were the sacrifice he was making that he was invested in or 
thought more worth discussing with a social scientist. This sense of sacrifice and struggle is a 
familiar experience for small-scale farmers in the United Kingdom, whose way of life is 
sustained by grants, loans, and subsidies season to season. Like Nelson’s experiences with 
ROCs, these various social payments by no means constitute a comfortable relationship with the 
state. In the aftermath of recent epidemics affecting livestock and the 2004 ban on foxhunting,4 a 
level of mistrust has permeated farming communities concerning government oversight. As 
competition with foreign producers grows, efforts to convince the government and general public 
that domestic farming is worth supporting have taken the form of collective action, as when pig 
farmers picketed Parliament to raise awareness of their economic difficulties in 2008. 
Similar to pig farmers, dairy farmers like the Nelsons have faced financial pressure from 
more cheaply produced agricultural goods abroad. At best, it is thought, digesters and ROCs 
should contribute to their continued survival within this competitive climate. Nelson now 
suspects ROCs no longer can, and he wants to switch to the United Kingdom’s new tariff 
program, introduced in 2009 for smaller generators, which obliges suppliers to purchase 
renewable energy at a fixed rate of 11.5p per kWh. Although the new law allows midsize 
generators (between 50 kWh and 5 MWh) to transfer from ROCs to FITs as well, this does not 
apply if generators are locked into a contract, as are the Nelsons’. Nelson blames Ofgem, in part, 
for its ineffectiveness and has been asking his members of Parliament to change the rules. For 
him, ROCs are like a bad grant that should be replaced with a new one, precisely because they 
are thought of as a means to secure a valuable way of life, one that is important to the 
government as well as to families. 
Sloan has his own methods of accounting for AD and ROCs. Always interested in 
promoting his farm, he appears in a YouTube video at a European climate change conference in 
2009. In the clip, a succinct introduction to his digester reveals a different position from 
Nelson’s: 
[ex]The economics, I guess, is the principal reason we actually undertook the venture. … 
The output of the plant is 370 kWh, and we look to run that for 8,000 hours a year, so 
with a current rate that’s available to us in the UK of 14.5 pence per kWh, or 17 
eurocents, we’re looking to turn over 422,000 of electrical income per year. 
Yet, his next statement echoes that of his Welsh counterpart: “it was a way to add value 
to the produce we grow on the farm.” 
[ex]Some of the spin-off benefits that have come out from [the digester] have been the 
fact that the digestate that comes out … has a much higher nitrogen value. … it also 
doesn’t smell … so we don’t get rejection problems with cattle feeding behind it, so 
that’s enabled us to make a saving of 60 to 70 percent on our imported nitrogen fertilizer, 
which means a direct cash saving. 
Like Nelson, Sloan’s estimation of “value” is part of a method of accounting that sees the 
farm as a total process of growth and transformation. But for him, this involves more precise 
calculations of energy and cash gained and lost. 
Ultimately, the main purpose of his digester is to serve as a showcase for his German 
technology. This shapes Sloan’s view of ROCs, which he sees not as assets but, rather, as risks to 
be managed carefully. The problem, he suggested to me, is that farmers tend to be risk averse: 
[ex]Farmers are bloody conditioned to getting grants. So you can tell people how much 
return on investment they’ll make, because of the double ROC, and then the next person 
will say, “Are there are any grants?” And I said, “Say I give you a 15 to 20 percent return 
on your investment, how much more do you want?” It’s a green premium, which is only 
15 percent of the price you get, that’s where the incentive is. [Imitates a rural farmer.] 
“Well, I’d rather have 40 percent up front and a lower price at the end,” because they just 
see it as derisking it. They see it as someone else’s job to take the risk. 
Taking the risk here means taking the ROCs. Sloan often tells prospective clients that 
they should disregard double ROCs from their estimates altogether, to avoid confusing risk for 
reward but also as a hedge against potential policy changes. Like Nelson, his position on ROCs 
has only become more ambivalent with the release of the new FIT law. This is because the value 
of ROCs is not set within the market but is further mediated by competing regulatory incentives. 
It is perhaps for these reasons—relational interpretations of ROCs as grants given, risks 
shared, or policies enforced—that small-scale generators subject to the RO are more likely to 
accept long-term contracts, or power purchase agreements, that bundle their green certificates 
with electricity, in effect providing the value of the ROC up front and offloading risk and reward 
to the energy supplier. As Sloan indicates, it is not simply about eliminating risk but maintaining 
familiar forms of obligation. A grant up front (which many are likely to have depended on in the 
past) serves as a familiar and dependable social payment, a fee for working in an undeveloped 
but important sector. 
Although it may be that small generators are more attuned to the kinds of accounting I 
have described thus far, the social payments or debt-relations occasioned by participation in the 
ROC market is similar for large renewable generators and energy suppliers. Most have tended to 
hoard renewable credits, rather than trading in large volumes as expected (Mitchell et al. 
2006:302). Cara, a renewable energy broker, described this to me as another accounting 
maneuver. It is why, for instance, her company convenes its ROC auction on a monthly basis, 
allowing suppliers to adjust their approach to the RO throughout the year. Because many 
suppliers own their own renewable generators, they too are vulnerable to planning and technical 
difficulties. As Cara put it, “What happens if they’ve been banking on getting 500,000 ROCs, a 
wind farm goes down, so they’re only going to get 400,000?” At different points throughout the 
obligation period, companies may seek to purchase extra ROCs quickly or to defer until the 
deadline, tactics a monthly auction helps make possible. In this instance, suppliers do not see the 
purchase of appreciating ROCs as an investment opportunity, as intended by the government, but 
as a form of social payment they are obliged to make. 
Deciding how to negotiate the ROC market takes shape in a context of established 
relations between farmers, energy companies, state agencies, and banks, encouraging the 
adoption of familiar accounting strategies. At the same time, it entails new forms of obliging and 
manipulating social payment and debt, crystallized around the experimental moment associated 
with climate change governance. In the next section, I will explain how these various motives 
surrounding credits and payments are translated by market devices into an authoritative record of 
exchange, which generates economic facts for reflexive control and critique of the ROC market. 
[h1]MARKET REFLECTIONS 
In 2002, the same year the RO was introduced, the EU passed the Renewables Directive. 
In keeping with the pragmatic ethos of European governance, governments were made 
responsible for deriving a specified percentage of their energy from renewables—without 
specifying how (see Barry 1993:316). Within the environmental policy communities of Euro-
America, market-based certificates and more directly subsidized tariffs have been the primary 
regulatory means of replacing fossil fuels with renewable sources. Generally speaking, 
preference for tariffs or certificates tends to overlap with a larger divide between social 
democratic and neoliberal ideologies of state action, respectively (see Toke 2005:362–63). Thus, 
TGCs have been favored by the United Kingdom, the United States, and transnational blocs like 
NAFTA’s Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the European Commission, while 
Canada and much of Western Europe have tended to favor FITs, along with groups like 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Such tendencies are indeed revealing, but I would suggest 
that they are not an ideological given; the apparent necessity or moral appeal of any policy is 
enacted through the practical technicalities of governance (see Ong 2006). 
In this section I document how the moral claims of neoliberal models acquire authority 
through their material embodiment in particular market devices. In particular, I describe the 
market devices that create a digital record of ROC transactions and shape the accounts of RO 
regulators, participants, and critics. Market devices accomplish this by distilling economic 
“facts” imbued with particular visions of what motivates individuals (self-interest) and how they 
act in economic situations (through competitive exchange). My approach follows Mitchell 
(2005) and Keane (2008), both of whom suggest that the objectification of market ideologies into 
facts and instruments renders them contestable and makes alternative market reflections possible. 
By 2001, TGC began to gain popularity in Europe. For one thing, it was believed to be 
more cost efficient than FIT and to match better with the deregulation of EU electricity markets. 
But certificates were also preferred because they offer a built-in audit function. Together, green 
certificates represent the total mega-wattage that is allocated to generators, traded, and eventually 
turned over to the regulator by suppliers. At the generator level, this audit mechanism is 
embodied by the ROC meter (see Figure 3). Each meter possesses a unique accreditation 
number; as electricity is generated, it is recorded as one certificate per MWh (or two for 
“emerging” technologies like digesters). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
 
Despite their seemingly neutral numerical operation, ROC meters are central to 
authoritative interpretations of the green certificate trade. ROC figures are ultimately submitted 
to Ofgem, which can then compare the debits allotted to suppliers with the credits they return at 
the end of each obligation period. In this way, renewable plants distribute energy and 
information in parallel, providing a mode of double-entry bookkeeping that documents actions 
within the renewable sector. Mary Poovey (1998) describes the emergence of double-entry 
bookkeeping in early modern Italy as not only a means of monitoring and balancing accounts but 
a form of moral persuasion. Recording financial transactions in this way made them appear 
undeniable and transparent, bestowing on them an aura of facticity. Because of the 
epistemological significance of double-entry bookkeeping as a source of demonstration, Poovey 
situates it as a precursor to the “modern fact.” The virtual market in renewable credits is 
essentially a market in facts—but facts for whom? 
According to Mitchell (2005), the way that “the economy” is materially and politically 
formatted—that is, as a knowable thing composed of distinct monetary exchanges—allows for 
the performance of expert knowledge. The RO presents the virtual production, exchange, and 
return of renewable credits, like entries in a public ledger, and the design of EU directives makes 
such accountability highly desirable. Because they are equipped with numerical representations 
of the market as a collection of transactions, state actors and policy experts can predicate about 
the growth of the United Kingdom’s renewable sector or the RO’s ability to meet European 
targets. The RO makes renewability legible, creating a pool of data at annual intervals, giving 
regulators the ability to routinely audit the market (to estimate the price per ROC, the amount of 
renewable energy created, the kinds of technologies promoted, etc.). Consequently, it also 
provides the flexibility to make necessary adjustments as the EU’s target deadlines approach. 
The market facts distilled from ROC meters also inform the adjustments made by leaving 
out the hesitations and negotiations characteristic of certificate circulation and facilitating the 
interpretation of ROCs as desirable wealth and the motivations of market actors as competitive, 
self-interested exchange. It is based on such conceptions of the economic, for example, that 
emerging technologies were thought best supported by doubling the ROCs they receive. 
Moreover, this interpretive frame is meant to circulate publicly, encouraging market 
participants to represent their own economic action as guided by self-interest. Initially skeptical 
of AD, the owner of a large composting operation in Dorset characterized his decision making in 
this way: “At the end of the day, I’m a tart. There’s the technology side of it as well, which was a 
bit iffy. … With the advent of two ROCs, it certainly tips the balance. … The extra financial 
rewards [make it worth the] gamble.” Poovey also suggested that double entry bookkeeping: 
“generalized rule governed behavior by encouraging merchants and their agents to reproduce in 
action the orderly logic of the books” (1998:11). In a similar way, renewable certificates 
reproduce an interpretative frame of self-interest, a policy instrument that translates political 
targets into personal desire. ROCs are a financial promise, an anticipatory entry in an account 
balance that persuades people to act as they should. 
Spreading such conceptions of economic action represents a fulfillment of an ideal 
element of market reflexivity that economists call “complete information,” which holds that 
“players” ought to be aware of the moves and motives available to others in the game, 
particularly those with whom one intends to trade. It is partly for this reason that the facts 
produced by ROC meters and collected by Ofgem are made publicly available through annual 
reports in print and online, simultaneously enacting the ideal transparency of a market to its 
participants and that of a government to its citizens. During the course of my research, a number 
of informants suggested a popular workshop on the RO sponsored by a consultancy in 
southwestern England. In fact, some addressed my questions about their experiences by 
forwarding to me documents they had received during such seminars, which offered clear 
diagrams outlining the circulation and valuation of ROCs year by year. Diagrams of historical 
ROC activity are not only informative but performative; they present the market as a series of 
precise, individual exchanges aggregated into a complete balance sheet. In the process, they also 
offer moral arguments in support of economistic decision making. Those without renewable 
investments are encouraged to make them; those with ROCs to sell are told of the virtue of 
interpreting ROCs as liquid assets, whose true value might best be realized through open 
auctions.5 
Unlike ROCs themselves, ROC facts travel internationally, animating discussions about 
the future of renewable energy policy. It has been alleged that green certificates have failed to 
encourage sufficient investment in the U.K. renewable sector, meaning that utility companies fall 
short of their obligations by a greater amount each year (Agnolucci 2007:3349). Economic 
efficiency is important to TGC initiatives: with more investment in renewable energy, more 
ROCs are generated and demand falls, leading to a lower overall cost per ROC and, ultimately, 
lower cost to energy customers. Whereas there were enough ROCs available to satisfy 70 percent 
of the RO in 2005, the number declined to 66 percent in 2007 and 64 percent in 2008 (Ofgem 
2009). During that same period, the value of each ROC (taking into account the contribution of 
the buyout fund) rose by nearly 18 percent. 
Is someone responsible for the RO’s purported failure? For some critics, ROC 
bookkeeping records the motives of market participants. A prominent argument among some 
policy analysts is that energy suppliers are colluding to produce fewer ROCs so as to miss the 
national target and extract more money from consumers over a longer period, at a lower cost to 
themselves (Mitchell et al. 2006:302–303; Toke 2005:366). This is difficult to prove, but its 
appeal is certainly because of the long history of corporate ambivalence and outright resistance 
to environmental reform in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Regardless of its veracity, this 
argument also relies heavily on the apparent facticity of ROC data and the assumptions about 
economic action such data embodies, identifying destructive patterns visible in the annual 
records as a product of greed for ROC wealth. 
In some instances, auctions are another device that disentangle green certificates from the 
generative sites they represent and make ROC exchanges appear further “calculated” in the 
process. From one perspective, auctions serve as a virtual marketplace for ROC sellers and 
buyers to locate one another and, it is presumed, find a more competitive price. In this sense, 
they represent a market within a market, another register reflexively responding to and shaping 
the overall RO. One of the more recent auctions, E-ROC, was created by the auditing body set up 
by energy supply companies to oversee the competitive grants of the United Kingdom’s original 
renewable policy. Operating four times a year, E-ROC is a blind and highly automated online 
auction. The site disentangles credits from generators, reducing bundles of ROCs to a fluid “lot,” 
connected only to specific ROC meter accreditation numbers. For buyers, the whole process is 
reduced to an anonymous exchange registered on separate computer screens, suppliers 
outbidding one another for a digital commodity in limited supply. 
Although disembedding fragments of economic reality is an important aspect of the 
material operation of online exchanges and energy meters, in actuality market devices are 
capable of eliciting very different reflections on the market. In Poovey’s account of the 
development of double-entry bookkeeping, settled accounts stood for the personal integrity and 
general virtue of Italian merchants. A stigmatized social class, merchants relied on bookkeeping 
as a way of managing impressions of their moral personhood (Poovey 1998:55–56). Of course, 
in the intervening centuries there has been a strong tendency to read “interests” as the prevailing 
source of individual motivation, in place of “passions” and “virtues” (Hirschmann 1977; Pocock 
1975). But accounting instruments are still capable of occasioning alternative ideas of economic 
action. 
An alternative ROC auction was developed by a private consulting firm I call 
“ExchangeRight” with considerable renewable investments. Cara, the energy trader introduced 
previously, is one of their employees. According to her, the auction filled a noticeable gap in the 
RO: 
[ex]How we started … was by building up a number of ROCs, say on a six-monthly 
basis, then going to a supplier. Because the supplier wouldn’t buy 500 ROCs from [the 
generator]—it’s not worth their while doing all of the admin—so we’d collect the ROCs 
up and then we’d sell them. But very quickly, we went from a couple of hundred to like 
this [whistles] … and then we suddenly realized that … we should be doing an auction. 
To Cara, ExchangeRight is opposed to the E-ROC auction as more than just a competitor; 
she questions its legality and speculates that it might tend to favor the energy supply companies 
that fund it. ExchangeRight, she claims, is more committed to making the ROC market “fair” 
than fluid, which is reflected by its auction. The bidding process is handled predominantly by 
phone. ExchangeRight representatives negotiate directly with top bidders to make sure they 
receive the volumes they want at a price advantageous to the generators. For Cara, part of the 
benefit of such a process is that all parties can be happy with their transactions. Perhaps it is 
more accurate to say that, because the exchange is more personalized, signs of “happiness” are 
rendered legible within the auction’s interpretive frame. 
The conflict between auctioning practices, like those dividing alternative ways of 
accounting for ROCs or environmental reform, reveals the heterogeneous influences that give 
shape to the market in renewability. To the extent that only some conceptions of the market gain 
traction as authoritative or necessary, it is in part because of the work accomplished by the 
market devices and financial instruments, whether grid connections, green certificates, ROC 
meters or auctions, all of which instantiate particular visions of the economic. But this does not 
foreclose alternative visions from taking hold. 
[h1]CONCLUSION 
There is clearly an elective affinity between the shared desire of government and the 
energy industry to make the “renewability” of energy tradable as a virtual commodity and the 
explosion in power broking that arose from the deregulation of electricity markets during the late 
1990s and early 2000s. The innovation of credit schemes for renewable energy, or carbon 
emissions, makes sense at a time when new and highly profitable market forms were being 
derived from energy trading and risks were operationalized into financial instruments, whether as 
hedges against market loss or forecasted environmental catastrophes. Similarly, in the face of 
widespread loss of faith and growing concern surrounding global financial instruments, it is 
telling that the U.K. government has now introduced a German-derived tariff scheme to 
supplement the RO, as if admitting the limitations of the market-based approach. 
Turning renewability and carbon into tradable commodities is meant to make 
environmental goals calculable as financial incentives, bringing individual motivations in line 
with ecological imperatives. Keith Hart writes, “How do we bridge the gap between a puny self 
and a vast, unknowable world? The answer is to scale down the world, to scale up the self or a 
combination of both, so that a meaningful relationship might be established between them” 
(2007:16). Such procedures require scalable models of the world and of the person. Arguably, 
debates over climate change science and policy have focused much more on the former. Scaling 
up individual actors through economic incentives, I have argued, relies on the assumption that 
selves are fundamentally driven by a desire for wealth. Thus, green credits are not merely 
instruments that allow participants in the energy sector to calculate interests; they produce and 
circulate representations of those participants as self-interested, in keeping with neoliberal 
ideology. 
The success of this ideology is evident in the reflections that predominate when market-
based policies fail to produce expected results, as when energy suppliers or producers interpret 
renewable certificates as social payments. Interestingly, Donald MacKenzie notes the same 
behavior among carbon traders. “Instead of treating a carbon market as a profit opportunity, most 
[treat] the new and unfamiliar scheme … as a compliance matter” (2009:174–175). According to 
him, these market participants still “have to be ‘taught’ to behave as economically rational 
agents” (MacKenzie 2009:174–175). The problem is that, whether one is talking about cap and 
trade or the Renewables Obligation, companies are accustomed to identifying government 
policies as a form of negotiable obligation; a credit might as well be a tax. Others suspect the 
motives of carbon emitters and energy suppliers, whom they claim are attempting to sabotage 
renewable energy and carbon reduction initiatives. However, both supporters and critics of an 
experimental market rely on the economic facts generated by market devices to reflect on its 
success and speculate on the beguiling motives of its participants. In this sense, I have argued, 
these devices not only “teach” participants to calculate; they also “teach” policymakers and 
economists to imagine participants’ motives as calculable according to neoliberal paradigms. 
What model of the person should we rely on and what forms of scaling up? I have argued 
that auctions and certificates admit of multiple interpretations and could just as easily proliferate 
alternative conceptions of human action and motivation. I would argue that these must account 
for the uncertainty and ambivalence of those participating in renewable energy and climate 
change initiatives at all levels. A central incongruity between subjective ideals and social 
realities constituted the basis for the economic histories written by Max Weber in The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Albert Hirschmann (1977). Whereas Weber famously 
argued that the iron cage of modern capitalism was the unintended product of Calvinist religious 
practices, Hirschmann focused on early advocates for capitalism, a social transformation that was 
“earnestly and fully expected to have certain effects that then wholly fail[ed] to materialize” 
(1977:131). Clearly there are examples of both unintended consequences and unrealized 
intentions in renewable energy and cap and trade initiatives. But where those Weber and 
Hirschmann describe at the birth of capitalism are burdened by obliviousness to the 
consequences of their actions, if anything, attempting to reform capitalism in the face of 
environmental catastrophe involves a burden of knowledge. 
Hirozaku Miyazaki (2003), Annelise Riles (2006), and Douglas Holmes and George 
Marcus (2006) all discuss the “failure of knowledge” as experienced by those who govern and 
monitor economies in the aftermath of market crashes. In such contexts, one cannot help but be 
aware that the most well-intentioned actions can produce unintended consequences while the 
loftiest of ideals go unrealized. In light of recent market failures and general mistrust of 
government, as well as the sheer complexity of abandoning fossil fuels or stopping climate 
change, it would be difficult to find someone with complete faith in green markets, whether this 
is assurance they will make a profit or that the earth will be saved. 
Nelson, for one, mocks the significance of his efforts for the climate, “it’s like urinating 
in the sea if you want to raise the sea level” and yet he feels compelled to try. I think Nelson’s 
sentiments are widely shared among those concerned with environmental and economic 
catastrophe but uncertain of what impact they can make, not because they lack the relevant 
knowledge but because they know enough to be skeptical. With climate change and renewable 
initiatives, one can typically identify a sense of disavowal on the part of participants—actions are 
not earnestly and fully expected to have the intended consequences but, perhaps out of hope, 
passion, obligation, interest or some other motivation, are engaged in all the same. 
I have shown how these ambivalent negotiations fall out of view because of the 
operations of certain market devices. Part of the reason this abstraction is successful is that the 
market seems to work irrespective of how strong or weak the motivations of its participants are. 
If the market works as designed, moreover, it may amplify their intentions even as it distorts 
them, building linkages with suppliers and consumers of energy, as well as with European and 
global efforts to address climate change. There may be only a few AD plants registered for 
ROCs, but this has invested them with greater renown as state-certified operations peddling 
virtual signs of a greater environmental purpose. This is why Sloan is invited to international 
conferences where he describes his digester as “a good step on the way to where agriculture 
needs to be” and why Nelson’s farm attracts so many visitors that he has begun charging 
anywhere from £200 to £1,000 for offering tours of his digester. 
Green certificates may yet become something more meaningful. Thinking more 
optimistically, they could represent a way of linking imperfect desires to “do something” to 
broader fields of engagement than the household or marketplace. Like more widely circulated 
and more trusted forms of money, green certificates could hold the potential to bridge the 
impersonal and the personal (Hart 2007) in the transformation of energy economies. But if this 
requires scaling up a model of an oblivious self with simple desires, it is not likely to reflect the 
reality of policy implementation on the ground. In this way, focusing on the ambivalent actions 
and disavowals associated with emerging green markets poses a challenge to the specter of 
Homo economicus in social theories of action. Behind the depiction of Hirschmann’s unrealized 
intentions or Weber’s unintended consequences lurks the presumption of a desiring ego cursed 
with imperfect knowledge: the economic subject ignorantly hopes for something to happen that 
never does, or something they never intended to happen unexpectedly occurs. The ways in which 
ROCs or carbon credits are accounted for, by contrast, reveals the significance of imperfect 
desire for conducting and reflecting on economic action. 
By highlighting the motivations of emerging markets I have attempted to draw attention 
to the technicalities and facts associated with fantasies of a desired reconciliation of capitalist 
and ecological values. In his account of bioprospecting in the ocean, Stefan Helmreich captures a 
related concept with the term blue-green capitalism, meaning “where blue stands for speculative 
sky-high promise and green for a belief in biological fecundity” (2008:107). Such speculative 
wonder at the possibilities of nature can just as quickly turn to sublime horror at the thought of 
losing or destroying that nature—an “alternation between promise and apocalypse” (Helmreich 
2008:15). Both images are crucial in contemporary syntheses of green capitalism—a 
fundamental fantasy leaving many ambivalent or frustrated while regulators and experts seek to 
motivate and understand them. 
[ab]This article examines efforts to reconcile capitalist and ecological values, focusing in 
particular on the instruments and ideologies that pervade the United Kingdom’s developing 
renewable energy sector. In keeping with neoliberal models of economic knowledge and 
practice, renewable energy instruments target the motivations of individuals by using incentive 
programs to reach environmental policy goals. The argument focuses especially on the way 
newly implemented market devices shape and represent the motivations of energy producers, 
suppliers, and traders. The centerpiece of the U.K. government’s initiative is the creation of an 
artificial market in renewability, bought and sold as a virtual commodity. Although the realities 
of economic motivation complicate the practical implementation of the renewable market, these 
are represented as isolated and self-interested “exchanges” by market devices, providing 
policymakers and their critics with partial yet authoritative accounts of renewable policy, 
premised on narrow and contested assumptions about economic motivation and action. [markets, 
STS, renewable energy, finance, climate change] 
[h1]NOTES 
1. Insofar as such approaches cling to a vision of a profitable and sustainable business, 
the perspective from Marxian ecology could suggest that they cannot solve the 
contradictions between capitalism and ecology and may deepen them even further. 
2. The names of all individuals and businesses have been changed to preserve their 
anonymity, with the exception of Murcott, who preferred it otherwise. 
3. But there is a great deal excluded from the diagram as well. In the case of both German 
tariff and U.K. quota programs, the role of consumers in subsidizing rematerialization 
may remain obscure, buried within energy bills as unexplained fees. 
4. Although hunting foxes with dogs in the British countryside has historically been a 
pursuit of social elites, it is an established ritual among farmers and became more socially 
inclusive in the late 20th century (see Milbourne 2003). 
5. I was initially so taken by these arguments, in fact, that I attempted to persuade Nelson 
and his wife to sell their ROCs at auction to get a better price. 
Editors’ Note: Cultural Anthropology has published a number of articles on markets and 
economies. See for example, Smoki Musaraj’s “Tales from Albarado: The Materiality of 
Pyramid Schemes in Postsocialist Albania” (2011), Douglas R. Holmes “Economy of 
Words” (2009), and Robert J. Foster’s “The Work of the New Economy: Consumers, 
Brands, and Value Creation” (2007). 
Cultural Anthropology has also published a number of articles on environmental politics, 
including, Thomas Pearson’s “On the Trail of the Living Modified Organisms: 
Environmentalism within and against Neoliberal Order” (2009), Marina A. Welker’s 
“‘Corporate Security Begins in the Community’: Mining, the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Industry, and Environmental Advocacy in Indonesia” (2009), and Joseph 
Masco’s “Mutant Ecologies: Radioactive Life in Post-Cold War New Mexico” (2004). 
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Figure captions 
FIGURE 1. A biological digester designed by James Murcott. 
FIGURE 2. The market in ROCs. 
FIGURE 3. ROC meters for a digester. 
